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RECLAIMING THE RIGHT TO CONSENT:
JUDICIAL BYPASS MECHANISM AS A WAY FOR
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES TO LAWFULLY
CONSENT TO SEXUAL ACTIVITY IN OHIO
MELISSA S. OBODZINSKI *
ABSTRACT
In Ohio, it is a criminal offense to engage in sexual conduct with another when his
or her ability to consent is “substantially impaired” because of a mental or physical
condition. There is no mechanism for persons with intellectual and/or developmental
disabilities to receive judicial notice of whether their ability to consent is “substantially
impaired” prior to criminal adjudication, nor is there a way for them to affirmatively
prove that they have the capacity to consent to sexual activity. Thus, under Ohio law,
intellectually and/or developmentally disabled individuals may be functionally and
irrevocably barred from engaging in sexual intimacy for fear of criminal penalties
against their partner.
Ohio’s criminal sexual violence laws serve an important function by protecting
vulnerable populations. However, they may also harm those they are designed to
protect by stripping entire classes of persons from engaging in lawful sexual intimacy
without providing any remedy for those that choose to do so. In Lawrence v. Texas,
the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy includes the right of
adult persons to engage in consensual sexual activity. Ohio undermines these privacy
rights when it fails to allow individuals to demonstrate that they are deserving of the
chance to prove they are capable of consenting to sexual activity.
This Note provides a solution to this problem, balancing the need to protect
vulnerable populations against sexual violence with an individual’s right to privacy:
the creation of a judicial bypass mechanism allowing an individual to reclaim his or
her right to engage in consensual sexual activity by demonstrating that he or she is
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sufficiently well-informed and mature to make the decision to engage in consensual
sexual activity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Sex is a prominent aspect of the human experience. From childhood, we are
promised that one day we will find a partner of our choosing, possibly have children
with that person, and live “happily ever after.” In school, children learn about sexual
health and wellness and—even in abstinence-based programs—there is a presumption
that eventually all persons will be able to experience this most private form of intimacy
and connection. Movies, television shows, books, magazines, and even news sources
further perpetuate the idea that sexual activity1 is a part of what it means to be
fundamentally human; that it is something everyone is thinking about and wants to
experience with another person or persons.2

1 Ohio’s criminal code defines “sexual conduct” as vaginal or anal penetration, and “sexual
contact” as any touching of an erogenous zone for the purpose of arousal or gratification. OHIO
REV. CODE. ANN. § 2907.01(A)–(B) (LexisNexis 2019). To avoid confusion with these statutory
definitions, this Note generically uses “activity” throughout to encompass both sexual conduct
and contact, although it should be noted that “sexual activity” is also statutorily defined. Id. §
2907.01(C) (defining “sexual activity” as sexual conduct, sexual contact, or both).
2 See, e.g., Christina Grant, Teens, Sex and the Media: Is there a Connection?, 8 PAEDIATRICS
&
CHILD
HEALTH
285,
285–86
(2003),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2792686/pdf/pch08285.pdf; DALE KUNKEL ET
AL., THE HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., SEX ON TV: CONTENT AND CONTEXT A BIENNIAL
REPORT 1 (1999), https://www.kff.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/sex-on-tv-a-biennialreport-to-the-kaiser-family-foundation-1999-report.pdf; Chaohua Lou et al., Media’s
Contribution to Sexual Knowledge, Attitudes and Adolescents and Young Adults in Three Asian
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Under Ohio law, however, some individuals are stripped of their ability to legally
engage in sexual activity (despite what may be an authentic desire to do so) because
of their persisting mental or physical condition. In Ohio, it is a criminal offense to
engage in sexual conduct with another when “[their] ability to resist or consent is
substantially impaired because of a mental or physical condition” and the offender
knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, that the person’s ability to resist or consent
is so impaired.3 While this statute does not criminalize the actions of the person whose
ability to consent is “substantially impaired” because of a mental, psychological, or
physical condition, a sexual partner of that person’s choosing could be charged with,
and convicted of, a first-degree felony. The effect of that criminalization is that some
persons cannot legally consent to sexual activity, despite their status as a legal adult
and desire to engage in such conduct.
Ohio’s criminal sexual violence laws, such as its forcible rape statue, are designed
to protect vulnerable populations.4 However, in doing so, these laws may cause harm
to those that they are designed to protect by stripping entire classes of persons of the
ability to engage in lawful, consensual sexual activity. These laws protect persons with
intellectual and/or developmental disabilities5 by creating a blanket rule that no person
may engage in sexual conduct with the protected individual.6 The formulation of this
law forces persons with intellectual and/or developmental disabilities into one of two

Cities,
3
J.
ADOLESCENT
HEALTH
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4235612/.

26,

26–36

(2014),

3 OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(c) (LexisNexis 2002).
4 Kathleen C. Basile, et al., Disability and Risk of Recent Sexual Violence in the United States,
5 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 928, 932 (2016) (“For both women and men, having a disability was
associated with an increased risk of sexual coercion and noncontact unwanted sexual
experiences.”).
5 This Note will strive to use the language of “intellectual and/or developmental disabilities”
to describe a variety of mental and physical conditions that may cause a person to be deemed as
unable to consent to sexual conduct or contact under Ohio Law. At times, quotes will be used
from cases that use language no longer accepted by the American Psychological Association,
persons with disabilities themselves, or disability rights groups, such as “mental retardation”.
See James Harris, New Terminology for Mental Retardation in DSM-5 and ICD-11, 26
CURRENT
OP.
PSYCHIATRY
260,
261,
https://journals.lww.com/copsychiatry/Citation/2013/05000/New_terminology_for_mental_retardation_in_DSM_5.6.aspx
#:~:text=In%20the%20United%20States%2C%20a,affected%20in%20all%20federal%20laws
(“The diagnostic term ‘mental retardation’ is finally being eliminated in the upcoming
international classifications of diseases and disorders. The term ‘mental retardation’ was
introduced by the American Association on Mental Retardation in 1961 and soon afterwards
was adopted by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) in its Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM-5). Mental retardation replaced older terms such as
feeblemindedness, ideocracy, and mental subnormality that had become pejorative. Now, over
five decades later, the term ‘mental retardation’ is being eliminated for similar reasons.”
(footnotes omitted)); 20 C.F.R. § 404, subpt. P, app. 1 (2013) (replacing the term “mental
retardation” with “intellectual disability” in the Listing of Impairments used to evaluate claims
involving mental disorders under the Social Security Act).
6 OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(c) (LexisNexis 2002).
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categories: substantially impaired or not substantially impaired.7 This imprecise
classification ignores the complexities of persons living with these disabilities by
presuming that they are all irrevocably incapable of engaging in safe, consensual sex.
Thus, they are barred from enjoying a private and personal liberty based solely on
another’s assessment of their abilities and capacity (and ultimately, their sexuality, or
lack thereof).
This Note argues that that there should be a mechanism by which persons with
mental, intellectual, and/or developmental disabilities can obtain the legal right to
consent to sexual activity when that ability may be stripped under criminal sexual
violence statutes. Part II of this Note addresses the issues of personal privacy and
liberty (as they relate to the right to engage in sexual activity) as a substantive right
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 In this Part, a discussion
of the history of constitutional challenges to state statutes that criminalize otherwise
private sexual conduct between adults will lay a foundation for understanding the
intersection of the State’s interest in promoting the health, safety, and welfare of its
citizens and a person’s right to privacy within the home.9 Part II then uses the holdings
of these cases to examine the State’s interest in creating a statute that criminalizes
sexual activity with persons who have a mental and/or physical condition, which
prevents them from being able to legally consent, and whether that interest can be
overcome by an adult person’s right to engage in private sexual activity with a person
of his or her choosing.
Part III of this Note examines the possibility of creating a judicial bypass
mechanism by which persons with mental, intellectual, and/or developmental
disabilities can obtain the legal right to consent to sexual activity, despite a statutory
presumption that they lack the capacity to do so under any circumstances. This
mechanism would be similar to the process available to an unemancipated pregnant
minor when she is seeking an abortion without the knowledge or consent of her
parents. Under Ohio law, a pregnant minor may obtain an order authorizing her ability
to consent to an abortion, without parental consent or notification, by demonstrating
to a judge that she is sufficiently informed and mature to make such a decision, and
that an abortion would be in her best interest. 10 Similarly, a person with intellectual
and/or developmental disabilities would be able to demonstrate his or her ability to
make a sufficiently well-informed and mature decision to engage in sexual activity to
a judge in order to obtain the ability to engage in lawful consensual sex. Finally, Part

7 See id.
8 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[No state shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . . .”).
9 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
10 OHIO REV. CODE. ANN § 2151.85(C)(1) (LexisNexis 1986) (“A woman who is pregnant,
unmarried, under eighteen years of age, and unemancipated and who wishes to have an abortion
without the notification of her parents . . . may file a complaint . . . requesting the issuance of
an order authorizing her consent to the performance or inducement of an abortion.”); Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 649 (1979) (“[W]here the pregnant minor goes to her parents and consent
is denied, she still must have recourse to a prompt judicial determination of her maturity or best
interests.”).
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III of this Note will address possible arguments against the creation of a judicial bypass
mechanism. It will demonstrate that successful prosecution against a person who
commits a crime of sexual violence against a person who receives a bypass order is
still possible. It will then argue that judges are well-equipped to make determinations
about whether a petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated his or her maturity and is
sufficiently well-informed to consent to sexual activity.
II. BACKGROUND
The right to engage in sexual activity is grounded in the right to privacy under the
Due Process Clause.11 The idea that persons have a protected interest in engaging in
sexual activity is foundational to the issue presented in this Note. A person’s interest
in privacy and bodily autonomy is not something that should be erased without
significant consideration by a legislative body.12 This Part first explores the history of
protection of privacy rights in the context of bodily autonomy and sexual activity. This
Part will then discuss notable challenges to state laws that criminalize sexual activity
under the Due Process Clause. Finally, this Part will discuss the use of judicial bypass
mechanisms in Ohio and other states as a way for a pregnant minor to assert her legal
right to abortion without the otherwise statutorily-required consent of her parents. This
background discussion will create a framework for understanding the scope of the
problem of criminalizing sexual activity with persons with intellectual and/or
developmental disabilities in all circumstances, and why a judicial bypass mechanism
is an effective way to combat this problem.
A.

The Right to Privacy in Intimate Sexual Activity

Under the Due Process Clause, the government is prohibited from depriving any
person of “life, liberty or property, without due process of the law.”13 This clause
articulates an individual’s right to fair judicial processes and creates substantive
limitations on governmental power. In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court
analyzed a state’s power to criminalize private sexual activity between two
consenting, unmarried adults under the Due Process Clause, and found that “[l]iberty
presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of . . . certain intimate conduct.”14
The law at issue in that case was a Texas statute which criminalized sexual activity
between two persons of the same sex.15 The petitioners in that case were two men who

11 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. (“[No state shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . . .”).
12 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (“[A] governmental purpose to control
or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.”).
13 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. (“[No state shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . . .”); see Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
14 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
15 Id. (“The applicable state law is Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.06(a) (2003). It provides: ‘A
person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual
of the same sex.’ The statute defines ‘deviate sexual intercourse’ as follows: ‘(A) any contact
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were engaging in consensual sexual intercourse when the police entered their home in
response to an unrelated report.16 The men were convicted, and the Court granted a
writ of certiorari to consider the constitutionality of the anti-sodomy statute.17 In a 5–
4 decision, the majority held that Texas had violated the petitioners’ right to liberty
under the Due Process Clause when it enacted a statute that furthered no legitimate
state interest which justified an intrusion into the petitioners’ personal and private
lives.18 In holding so, the Court relied on the fact that the case did not involve adult
persons who “might be injured or coerced”19 and that the statute criminalized
otherwise lawful sexual activity.20 This case was significant; it marked a departure
from earlier cases that had upheld statutes criminalizing sexual activity between
persons of the same sex,21 and did so by recognizing a substantive right to sexual
activity under the Due Process Clause.
B.

Limitations on the Right to Privacy and the State’s Interest in Protecting
Vulnerable Populations

Following Lawrence, there has been an ongoing question of what types of sexual
activity are constitutionally protected, and under what circumstances a state has a
legitimate interest that justifies creating a law that criminalizes such conduct. In 2011,
an Ohio statute that criminalized engaging in sexual conduct with an adult stepchild22
was challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive right to privacy.23 The
Ohio Supreme Court upheld the law, finding that the statute bore a rational relationship

between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person; or (B)
the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object.’”).
16 Id. at 562.
17 Id. at 563.
18 Id. at 578. (“The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot
demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.
Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their
conduct without interventions of the government.”).
19 Id. (“The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be
injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be
refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to
enter.”).
20 Id. at 575.
21 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (upholding Georgia’s antisodomy law).
22 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A)(5) (Lexis Nexis 1994) (making it a crime to “engage
in sexual conduct with another, not the spouse of the offender, when . . . . [t]he offender is the
other person’s natural or adoptive parent, or a stepparent, or guardian, custodian, or person in
loco parentis of the other person”).
23 State v. Lowe, 861 N.E.2d 512, 516 (Ohio 2007); Lowe v. Swanson, 663 F.3d 258, 258–
59 (6th Cir. 2011).
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to Ohio’s legitimate interest in protecting the family from the “destructive influence”
of sexual relationships between stepparents and their (adult) stepchildren.24 On
appeal, the Sixth Circuit similarly distinguished this case from Lawrence, reasoning
that the stepchild-stepparent relationship is one in which a person might be injured or
coerced or where “consent might be easily refused, regardless of age, because of the
inherent power dynamic within such a relationship.”25 The court therefore affirmed
the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court, finding that Ohio’s interest in criminalizing
incest is different from, and greater than, the interest that Texas had in criminalizing
same-sex sexual activity, because it was concerned with protecting the family.26 The
U.S. Supreme Court unanimously denied certiorari to further consider this issue. 27
Ohio’s criminal sexual violence code includes a number of enumerated offenses
relating to a person’s capacity to consent, or lack thereof, because of a diminished
mental and/or physical capacity.28 Under Ohio’s forcible rape statue, any person who
engages in sexual conduct with another, who is not his or her spouse, when “the other
person’s ability to resist or consent is substantially impaired because of a mental or
physical condition . . . and the offender knows or has reasonable cause to believe that
the other person’s ability to resist or consent is substantially impaired because of a
mental or physical condition” is guilty of a first degree felony. 29 Similarly, Ohio’s
sexual battery statute dictates that “no person shall engage in sexual conduct with
another . . . when . . . the offender knows the other person’s ability to appraise the
nature of or control the other person’s own conduct is substantially impaired.” 30
Ohio courts have used the language of these statutes to infer that where a certain
person is found to have an intellectual and/or developmental disability (“mental
retardation”),31 the substantial impairment element of these crimes is met. However,
there are difficulties in determining what evidence is considered sufficient to support
such a finding in cases regarding the mental impairment of a victim, and to what
degree that evidence is persuasive.
In State v. Zeh, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that, while the phrase “substantially
impaired” is not legislatively defined, it “must be given the meaning generally
understood in common usage.”32 In that case, the defendant had been convicted of
24 Swanson, 663 F.3d at 260 (quoting State v. Lowe, 861 N.E.2d 512, 518 (Ohio 2007)).
25 Id. at 264.
26 Id. (“Unlike sexual relationships between unrelated same-sex adults, the stepparentstepchild relationship is the kind of relationship in which a person might be injured or coerced
or where consent might not be easily refused, because of age, because of the inherent influence
of the stepparent over the stepchild.”).
27 Lowe v. Swanson, 566 U.S. 992 (2012) (denying petition for writ of certiorari).
28 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.02, .03(A)(2), .05(A)(5), .06(A)(2) (LexisNexis 2022).
29 Id. § 2907.02.
30 Id. § 2907.03(A)(2).
31 See supra note 5.
32 State v. Zeh, 509 N.E.2d 414, 418 (Ohio 1987) (“[S]ubstantial impairment must be
established by demonstrating a present reduction, diminution or decrease in the victim’s ability,
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sexual battery33 against a victim whose impairment was the result of an “asserted
mental retardation with which the young man had been afflicted with for a good
number of years.”34 The prosecution entered tests conducted by a psychologist, prior
to the trial, into evidence to establish the mental condition of the victim.35 These tests
assessed the victim’s mental and social capacities regarding special education
curriculum, rather than sexuality, and the administering psychologist did not have
expertise in human sexual behavior.36 The defendant argued that he was treated
unfairly by being denied the opportunity to bring his own expert in to conduct an
examination of the victim to assess his mental condition.37 The court agreed, and held
that in cases where the mental condition of the victim is contested and is an essential
element of the crime charged, the defendant may move to have previous independent
clinical interviews of the victim excluded, unless the victim voluntarily agrees to a
court-appointed, independent examination.38 The case was therefore remanded.39
More recently, in State v. Browder, the Eighth District Court of Appeals of Ohio
construed the holding of Zeh to mean that the State’s burden of establishing substantial
impairment is not met by showing “mental retardation” or some form of psychological
disease, but rather by showing a reduction or decrease in the victim’s ability to think
or act.40 In that case, the defendant had been convicted of the forcible rape of a 16year-old victim who was “cognitively challenged.”41 The court found that the State
had met its burden of establishing substantial impairment based on a number of
witnesses describing the victim’s cognitive deficiencies, and the “conspicuous nature
of [the victim’s] limitations.”42

either to appraise the nature of his conduct or to control his conduct. This is distinguishable
from a general deficit in an ability to cope, which condition might be inferred from or evidenced
by a general intelligence or I.Q. report.”).
33 § 2907.03(A)(2).
34 Zeh, 509 N.E.2d at 418.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. The court noted that this holding and opinion were fashioned upon a “very narrow basis,
and with limited scope.” Id.
39 Id. at 419.
40 State v. Browder, No. 99727, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 93, at *11–12 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan.
16, 2014).
41 Id. at *1–2.
42 Id. at *11–12 (“Several witnesses, including [the victim’s] family, the responding EMS
and police personnel, and [the victim’s] school counselor established evidence that [the victim]
is cognitively challenged. One responding officer went so far as treating [the victim] as if she
were much younger than an average 16-year-old, and another officer made a similar assessment
after a brief two-minute conversation.”).
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The First District Court of Appeals of Ohio, similarly, found that a “finding of
mental retardation . . . could logically lead one to believe that a person who is mentally
retarded is substantially impaired” within the meaning of Ohio’s sexual battery
statute.43 In that case, the defendant had been convicted of sexual battery against a
minor with a “mental impairment.”44 The appellate court overruled the defendant’s
assignment of error (asserting that the court erroneously found that “mental
retardation” is equivalent to substantial impairment) because it found the record
showed that the trial court did not predicate its conclusion solely on that basis. 45 The
same appellate court, in a different case, concluded that a psychologist’s report
provided sufficient evidence for reasonable minds to disagree as to whether the victim
had the ability to appraise the nature of or control her conduct for the purposes of the
sexual battery statute.46 In that case, the defendant had been convicted of four counts
of sexual battery47 against a twenty-six-year-old woman who was a resident of a group
residence for persons with intellectual and/or developmental disabilities. 48 Finding
that reasonable minds could reach different conclusions about whether the prosecution
proved the element of substantial impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, the court
found that the defendant’s motion for acquittal was properly overruled.49
These cases demonstrate that there is a lack of consistency and clarity in the way
that courts interpret “substantial impairment” for the purpose of proving that a person
with an intellectual and/or developmental disability is not capable of consent in
criminal sexual violence cases. Further, the Court’s holding in Lawrence offered little
to no guidance on when sexual activity between two adults may be permissibly
criminalized by a state, other than when personal injury or coercion could occur.50

43 State v. Joseph, No. C-840751, 1985 Ohio App. LEXIS 6953, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. July
24, 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A)(2) (LexisNexis 2009).
44 Joseph, 1985 Ohio App. Lexis 6953, at *1. The appellate court did not recount the exact
facts of the case but did indicate that that the trial court properly concluded that the defendant
had knowledge that the victim’s ability to appraise the nature of his conduct was substantially
impaired because it heard from witnesses and had the opportunity to observe the victim’s
demeanor in the courtroom and witness stand. Id. at *10.
45 Id. at *8 (“[T]he court found in evidence many factors which led to the conclusion that the
victim was substantially impaired.”).
46 State v. Bohannon, No. C-880004, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 831, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar.
15, 1989).
47 Id. at *1; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A)(2) (LexisNexis 2009).
48 Bohannon, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 831, at *1.
49 Id.
50 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (“The [anti-sodomy] statutes do seek to
control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is
within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals. This, as a general
rule, should counsel against attempts by the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the
relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution that the
law protects. It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this
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This lack of uniformity in statutory interpretation and guidance on the balance between
state interest in criminalizing sexual violence and individual interest in engaging in
private sexual activity leaves persons with intellectual and/or developmental
disabilities with a patchwork of protections and liberties. The determination of
whether a person is “substantially impaired” may be based on psychological reports,
medical diagnoses, or even the generalized perception of others as to the individual’s
capacity.51 This determination is also made post-hoc, after someone has been charged
with a crime of sexual violence. Thus, persons with intellectual and/or developmental
disabilities may or may not fall under the protections of these laws, but it is impossible
to assess where they fall within that legal binary before engaging in sexual activity. If
having an intellectual and/or developmental disability of a specific type is enough to
convince a court that the individual was incapable of consent under any circumstance,
then these persons cannot have lawful sex. This concern, the concern that the State is
impermissibly interfering with a person’s right to engage in private intimate activity
within their home, is precisely what the Court in Lawrence addressed when it
invalidated Texas’s anti-sodomy statute.52
C.

Judicial Bypass Mechanisms to Override a Lack of Statutory Consent

The Ohio legislature has created a mechanism for ordering legal consent for a
person where it is otherwise unavailable in another instance where a person’s right to
privacy in intimate affairs is statutorily limited.53 Under Ohio law, a minor may seek
an abortion without the requisite consent or knowledge of the minor’s parent or
guardian using a “judicial bypass mechanism.”54 This law allows a pregnant and
unmarried minor to file a complaint, in the juvenile court of the county in which she
resides, requesting a judicial order authorizing her to consent to the performance or
inducement of an abortion without the notification or consent of her parents, guardian,
or custodian.55 The complainant must include an allegation that she is “sufficiently
mature and well enough informed to intelligently decide whether to have an abortion
without the notification of her parents, guardian or custodian” or alternatively, that
one of her parents, guardian, or custodian had committed abuse against her, or that
notifying them would otherwise not be in her best interest.56 The court is, by statute,
required to appoint a guardian ad litem and an attorney, if the guardian ad litem is not

relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their
dignity as free persons.”).
51 See, e.g., Bohannon, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 831, at *3 (finding that the psychologist
report was sufficient to determine the level of the victim’s disability).
52 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private
lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private
sexual conduct a crime.”).
53 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.85 (LexisNexis 1986).
54 Id.
55 Id. § 2151.85(A).
56 Id. § 2151.85(A)(4)(a)–(b).
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admitted to the practice of law, to protect the interest of the complainant at the hearing,
if one is granted.57
The Supreme Court has held that laws creating a judicial bypass mechanism for
minors to obtain abortion without parental consent are permissible so long as the
procedure allows the pregnant minor to go before a judge in a proceeding that ensures
her anonymity and is conducted with “sufficient expedition” to actually allow her to
obtain abortion care.58 The judge must then decide whether she has proven that that
she is “mature enough and well enough informed to make her abortion decision, in
consultation with her physician, independent of her parents’ knowledge; or that the
desired abortion would be in her best interests, even if she is not able to make this
decision independently.”59 In its opinion, the Court discussed the vulnerability of
minors to deprivation of liberty by the State, and emphasized that children have many
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment that are coextensive with those of adult
persons.60 Thus, the Court found that the judicial bypass law permissibly granted an
avenue by which a minor could petition for recognition of her right to privacy.
The creation and use of the judicial bypass mechanism in relation to a minor child’s
right and ability to obtain an abortion in the absence of parental consent thus, in the
Court’s view, strikes a fair balance between individual liberty interests and Ohio’s
interest in protecting vulnerable populations. These mechanisms have been upheld
even where a (lawful) abortion statute criminalizes the actions of other parties who
engage with the protected person. A similar mechanism, therefore, could serve as a
solution to the issue of judicially pre-determining a person’s ability or right to legally
consent to sex when the law has criminalized having sex with that person.
III. ANALYSIS
The purpose of this Note is to consider the use of a judicial bypass mechanism by
which individuals with an intellectual and/or developmental disability may obtain a
court order affirming their right to consent to sexual activity, so that they may engage
in lawful sex with another person or persons. Lawrence created precedent asserting
that adults have a liberty right to privacy in their sexual relations, when those relations
are between consenting adults.61 A logical deduction from the holding of Lawrence,
therefore, is that a state does have a legitimate interest in criminalizing sexual activity

57 Id. § 2151.85(B)(2).
58 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 644 (1979).
59 Id.
60 Id. at 634 (“The Court’s concern for the vulnerability of children is demonstrated in its
decisions dealing with minors’ claims to constitutional protection against deprivations of liberty
or property interests by the State. With respect to many of these claims, we have concluded that
the child’s right is virtually coextensive with that of an adult. For example, the Court has held
that the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee against the deprivation of liberty without due
process of law is applicable to children in juvenile delinquency proceedings.”).
61 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003).
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that is not consensual and/or not between adult persons. 62 However, there are
challenges to balancing these interests entirely in favor of the State when the persons
a statute purports to protect are stripped of a personal freedom by categorizing them
with a broad brush.63 The following Part of this Note will first discuss the importance
of protecting the rights of adults to engage in sexual activity. It will then propose the
use of a judicial bypass mechanism as a way for adult persons with intellectual and/or
developmental disabilities to obtain the legal right to consent to sexual activity.
Finally, it will examine and challenge arguments in opposition to the use of a judicial
bypass mechanism in this context.
A.

Consideration of the Right of All Persons to Engage in Sexual Conduct

Lawrence v. Texas was a seminal case which defined the rights of nonmarried
adults to engage in private and consensual activity in their homes under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.64 In Lawrence, the Court specifically
noted that the case at bar did not involve minor children or “persons who might be
injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not be
easily refused,” but rather two adults who chose to engage in sexual activity with “full
and mutual consent for each other.”65 The Court specifically distinguished same-sex
sexual activity from sexual activity in which one party lacks the legal capacity to
consent when it found that the Texas statute furthered no legitimate state interest so as
to justify the intrusion into the private lives of individuals engaging in sodomy. Ohio’s
sexual violence statutes, where they seek to protect individuals whose ability to
consent is substantially impaired, therefore, are more likely to survive a Due Process
Clause challenge under Lawrence than a law that criminalizes same-sex sexual activity
between two adults.
In Haynes v. Boyd, the Sixth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of a Tennessee
statute which criminalizes sexual activity with persons whose ability to consent is
impaired due to a mental disability, similar to Ohio’s forcible rape statute. 66 In that

62 Id. at 578 (“The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who
might be easily coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be
refused.”).
63 Recall that in Zeh, an Ohio appellate court highlighted that “substantial impairment” is not
legislatively defined and must be given its common usage meaning. 509 N.E.2d at 417. See also
supra Part II.B (discussing the difficulties in determining what evidence may be admitted to
determine substantial impairment due to a “mental or physical condition” under the Ohio
Revised Code).
64 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79 (“The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private
lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private
sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full
right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government.”); U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. (“[No state shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law . . . .”).
65 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
66 Haynes v. Boyd, No. 16-cv-01258, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72612, at *14–15 (W.D. Tenn.
Apr. 24, 2020) (“[T]he Supreme Court limited its ruling in Lawrence to cases involving sexual
activity between ‘mutual[ly] consent[ing]’ adults . . . . The Court was careful to note that its
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case, a “mentally challenged” man was charged with the rape of two other “mentally
challenged” adults.67 The court found that the victims both lacked the ability to
consent, and the defendant was found to be “higher functioning” than the victims. 68
On appeal, the defendant claimed that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel
because his attorney did not challenge the constitutionality of the Tennessee rape
statute under the Due Process Clause.69 The court determined that an argument under
Lawrence was not persuasive because it involved sexual activity between nonconsenting adults.70
In Lawrence, the Court overturned Bowers v. Hardwick,71 noting that the laws and
traditions of the previous five decades of literature and case law showed “an emerging
awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to
conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex,” and that history and tradition
are only the starting point of the substantive due process inquiry. 72 Thus, an inquiry
into the history of the condemnation of sexual activity with persons living with mental,
intellectual, and/or developmental disabilities is the starting point in examining such
a person’s rights under the Due Process Clause.
People in the United States tend to view people with intellectual and/or
developmental disabilities as asexual and uninterested in sex, much like children.73
This societal perception does not go unnoticed, and people with intellectual and/or
developmental disabilities regularly report stigma experiences related to their
sexuality and bodily autonomy.74 People with intellectual and/or developmental
ruling does not apply to cases ‘involv[ing] persons who are situated in relationships where
consent might not easily be refused.’” (citation omitted)).
67 Id. at *1–4. The victims in this case were intellectually disabled adult twin grandsons of
the Defendant’s girlfriend. Id.
68 Id. at *3. (“Forensic and clinical psychiatrist Dr. Fred Steinberg testified regarding his
evaluations of the victims and the Defendant . . . . He reported ‘that the victims were both mildy
mentally retarded[,] . . . had a low I.Q.,’ and ‘functioned at a five-year-old level with regard to
their development, including language development, self-direction, and socialization.’ . . . Dr.
Steinberg related that the Defendant was mildly mentally retarded, had ‘a higher level of
executive functioning’ than the victims, and could understand and ‘plan . . . sexual activity[.]’”
(citation omitted)).
69 Id. at *8–9.
70 Id. at *14–16.
71 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (holding that state laws that criminalize
same-sex sodomy were constitutional under the Due Process Clause when they represented an
essentially moral choice by the legislature).
72 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003).
73 Lorna Collier, Sex and Intellectual Disabilities, 48 MONITOR
http://www.apa.org/monitor/2017/12/seeking-intimacy-sidebar.

ON

PSYCH. 52 (2017),

74See generally NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN AND FAMS. & AUTISTIC SELF-ADVOC. NETWORK,
ACCESS, AUTONOMY, AND DIGNITY: COMPREHENSIVE SEXUAL EDUCATION FOR PEOPLE WITH
DISABILITIES (2021); Kelsey A. Bonfils et al., Sexuality and Intimacy Among People Living with
Serious Mental Illnesses: Factors Contributing to Sexual Activity, 38 PSYCHIATRIC REHAB. J.
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disabilities often express a desire to be loved and experience romantic relationships,
but report that caregivers rarely discuss sexuality with them and restrict their
opportunities to engage in sexual experiences.75 While this perception is not the
primary basis for legislation that seeks to criminalize sexual activity with these
persons,76 it may shed light on why states like Ohio have not sought to create a
mechanism by which persons with intellectual and/or developmental disabilities may
affirmatively assert their right or ability to consent prior to engaging in sexual activity.
In Lawrence, the Court specifically stated that the case at bar did not pertain to
sexual activity between persons who lacked the ability to consent. 77 However, it also
specifically noted that the Framers “knew times can blind us to certain truths and later
generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to
oppress.”78 This concept could be applied to the emerging awareness: that people with
mental, intellectual, and/or developmental disabilities can and do, in fact, have sexual
desires. This Note does not argue or suggest that Ohio’s criminal sexual violence
statutes are unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to all
persons, but rather that there should be an opportunity for persons with disabilities to
challenge the law as it applies to them individually.
Suppose there is a woman in Ohio who is living with an intellectual or
developmental disability. She has a low I.Q. and received special services throughout
her education. Now, in adulthood, she works part-time at a store and continues to live
with her parents. For all intents and purposes, this person is living a happy, wellrounded life. However, her parents are protective and firmly believe that their child
cannot and should not engage in sexual activity under any circumstance because of
her disability. Now suppose she meets someone at her job, a man who is also living

249, 250 (2015), https://psycnet.apa.org/fulltext/2015-05637-001.pdf; Milton L. Wainberg et
al., Mental Illness Sexual Stigma: Implications for Health and Recovery, 39 PSYCHIATRIC
REHAB. J. 90, 90 (2016), https://psycnet.apa.org/fulltext/2016-15746-001.pdf .
75 Dilana Schaafsma et al., People with Intellectual Disabilities Talk About Sexuality:
Implications for the Development of Sex Education, 35 SEXUALITY AND DISABILITY 21, 22
(2017),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5306299/pdf/11195_2016_Article_9466.pdf.
76 Sexual Abuse of People with Disabilities: Understanding the Crime, RAPE, ABUSE &
INCEST NAT’L NETWORK, https://www.rainn.org/articles/sexual-abuse-people-disabilities (last
visited Oct. 14, 2020) (noting that people with disabilities are sexually assaulted at higher rates
than the general population); Vilissa Thompson et al., Sexual Violence and the Disability
Community,
CTR.
FOR
AM.
PROGRESS
(Feb.
12,
2021),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/disability/news/2021/02/12/495746/sexual-violencedisability-community/ (“Sexual violence against disabled people is a silent epidemic . . . people
with disabilities [are] more than three times more likely than nondisabled people to experience
serious violent crime such as rape and sexual assault . . . . The myths people believe about the
sexuality and autonomy of disabled people fuel these assaults. These myths including
stereotyping all disabled people as asexual, believing disability means an inability to participate
equally in an intimate relationship, and assuming that disabled people cannot control their
urges.”).
77 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
78 Id. at 579.
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with a developmental disability but is “higher functioning” than she is. He also works
part-time but is able to live in a small apartment by himself. The couple falls in love
and decides together that they want to engage in sexual activity. They go back to the
woman’s parents’ home and begin to engage in such activity. Her parents, enraged,
call law enforcement and the woman’s new partner is arrested and charged with sexual
battery. The case is then tried, and the man is found guilty because the prosecution
successfully demonstrated that he was higher functioning than the woman, and the
jury believed that he had taken advantage of her.79 In this hypothetical, the law has
afforded the woman no way to lawfully engage with persons of her choosing, and thus
perhaps extends beyond the exceptions seemingly carved out of Lawrence, because
she has been deemed to have no right to privacy within the scope of sexual contact or
conduct.
Judicial Bypass as a Method of Affirming a Person’s Right to Engage in
Intimate Sexual Activity

B.

In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court found that in balancing a woman’s
right to terminate her pregnancy80 against a State’s valid interest in protecting
potential life, the State had the power to regulate abortion, so long as such regulations
do not “create a substantial obstacle to a woman’s exercise of the due process right.”81
In Bellotti v. Baird, the Court, in interpreting Casey, held that States that have a
parental consent statute regulating abortion must also enact a law that allows a minor
to obtain a court order to bypass her parent’s or guardian’s consent.82 Here, the Court
noted that “a child, merely on account of his minority, is not beyond the protection of
the Constitution . . . [the] Fourteenth Amendment [is] not for adults alone.” 83 It

79 As was the case in Haynes v. Boyd (where the defendant and the victim(s) were both
determined to be “mildly mentally retarded” but the defendant was higher functioning). Haynes
v. Boyd, No. 16-cv-01258, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72612, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 24, 2020).
80 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (holding that a woman has a right to terminate
her pregnancy under the Due Process Clause).
81 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
Our precedents ‘have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot
enter.’ These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to
the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right
to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.
Id. at 851 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 156, 166 (1944)).
82 Belloitti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 650–51 (1979).
83 Id. at 633–34. (“The Court’s concern for the vulnerability of children is demonstrated in
its decisions dealing with minors’ claims to constitutional protection against deprivations of
liberty or property interests by the State. With respect to many of these claims, we have
concluded that the child’s right is virtually coextensive with that of an adult. For example, the
Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee against the deprivation of liberty
without due process of law is applicable to children in juvenile delinquency proceedings.”).
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identified that constitutional principles are generally applied “with sensitivity and
flexibility to the special needs . . . of children” due to their vulnerability and their
inability to make critical decisions in an informed and mature manner. 84 Thus, the
Court found that a pregnant minor is entitled to the option to show that she is mature
and well-informed enough to make a decision regarding abortion in consultation with
a physician and without the permission of her parents, and that any laws which require
parental consent without a bypass mechanism imposed an undue burden upon the
minor’s right to seek an abortion.85
The judicial bypass mechanism, thus, imposes a situation whereby a minor may
assert her liberty right to privacy under the Due Process Clause by coming before a
judge, despite the State having regulated based on its interests in both protecting
potential life, the health and safety of minors, and a parent’s right to be involved in
medical decisions for a child. A judicial bypass mechanism, which would allow a
person with an intellectual and/or developmental disability to obtain the right to
consent, would function in a similar manner. The goal would be for the petitioner to
sufficiently demonstrate that he or she is mature and well-informed enough to make
the decision to engage in consensual sexual activity.
The stigma associated with people with intellectual and/or developmental
disabilities, combined with a societal perception that these people are uninterested in
sexual activity, leads this population to know less about sex than those without such
disabilities.86 As a part of demonstrating to the court that he or she is mature and wellinformed enough to make decisions regarding sexual activity, an individual may seek
a specialized sexual education program. There are a number of non-profit
organizations that offer sexual education programs designed for persons with
disabilities.87 In many sexual assault cases in which the victim’s ability to consent is
at issue, the court will ask targeted questions to determine whether the victim
understands the nature of sexual activity.88 If these persons are not offered
comprehensive sexual education in school, due to their enrollment in special education
programs, they may have no basis to understand such conduct. By offering this
84 Id. at 634.
85 Id. at 643–44.
86 Collier, supra note 73; Thompson et al., supra note 76 (“Sexuality is a key part of human
nature: All people deserve to express themselves sexually–and safely–regardless of ability.
Achieving this goal requires a comprehensive and intentional effort to overcome myths,
misinformation, and a lack of information. Disabled people should be empowered with
knowledge about consent and have access to appropriate sex education in school from an early
age . . . . The disability community endures much higher rates of sexual violence, lack of access
to sex education, and the failure of society to understand that sexuality belongs to everyone.”).
87 See, e.g., Developmental Disability Education Program, FAM. RES. NETWORK OF OHIO,
https://www.frnohio.org/resources/listing/developmental-disability-educationprogram?tab=related&p=2&category=0&zoom=10&is_mile=1&directory_radius=100&view
=list&sort=title#sabai-inline-content-related (last visited May 6, 2022).
88 See generally State v. Lopez, No. 94312, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 191 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan.
20, 2011); State v. Brady, No. 87854, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 1332 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 29,
2007); State v. Dorsey, No. 2007-CA-091, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 2125 (Ohio Ct. App. May
23, 2008).
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education proactively, and by the person’s demonstration of mastery of the content,
he or she would be empowered to engage in sexual activity from a more mature and
well-informed mental state.
Another way a person may demonstrate to the court that he or she is mature and
well-informed enough to consent to sexual activity is by presenting affidavits from
licensed psychologists or other experts supporting the petitioner’s claim. This would
be similar to the types of assessments and tests that are used in criminal cases to
demonstrate that a person lacks the ability to consent. 89 These tests, similarly, could
be conducted by a forensic psychologist assigned by the court, or by a private
practitioner that has provided either therapeutic services to the person generally or
evaluation services solely for the purpose of the petition.
Generally, to demonstrate his or her ability to consent, a person would have to
meet requirements that mirror those that are used to prove that they did not have such
ability during a criminal trial. The main difference here is that the process would be
proactive, prior to an arrest for sexual assault. Returning to the hypothetical case,
imagine now that the woman who has fallen in love goes before a judge and
demonstrates that she has received sexual education, understands the nature of sexual
activity and how to consent, and that her doctor agrees that she is capable of engaging
in safe sex. The court rules that she has demonstrated with sufficiency that she is
mature and well-informed enough to consent to sexual activity. Now, when the
woman’s parents call law enforcement to report the sexual activity between their
daughter and her partner, she will present the court order. The police would likely still
investigate whether she, in fact, consented to the sexual activity, and, upon finding
that she did, would not arrest or charge her partner. By granting the judicial bypass
request, the court has not only reaffirmed the woman’s bodily autonomy and right to
engage in private intimate conduct, but also saved her the pain and embarrassment of
going through a criminal trial in which her intimate sexual activity and mental abilities
are litigated and made public record.
C.

Judicial Bypass in the Context of Criminal Sexual Assault Prosecutions

Opponents of this proposed judicial bypass mechanism will argue: (1) that it will
be difficult to prosecute crimes of sexual violence against persons who have obtained
such an order, and (2) it will be difficult for judges to determine whether a person has
demonstrated that they have the ability to understand the nature of sexual activity and
therefore consent. However, in analyzing arguments about consent that arise in
criminal sexual violence trials and the context by which judicial bypass mechanisms
have worked to assist minors in abortions, these arguments are without merit. A
judicial bypass mechanism in this context will not lead to more difficulty in
prosecuting crimes of sexual violence, and local judges are more than capable of
evaluating a petitioner’s ability to consent and ruling appropriately on the facts
available.
Securing a conviction for crimes of sexual violence is challenging. National
statistics show that very few cases prosecuted for forcible rape result in a conviction,

89 See, e.g., State v. Browder, No. 99727, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 93, at *11 (Ohio Ct. App.
Jan. 16, 2014); State v. Zeh, 509 N.E.2d 414, 418 (Ohio 1987); State v. Joseph, No. C-840751,
1985 Ohio App. LEXIS 6593, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. July 24, 1985); Haynes v. Boyd, No. 16-cv01258, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72612, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 24, 2020).
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and even fewer result in incarceration.90 Criminal laws in Ohio and throughout the
country have sought to encourage prosecution and help secure convictions, while still
upholding defendants’ procedural due process rights. 91 As acts of sexual violence are
more likely to occur in private and without witnesses, prosecutors have specific
challenges in proving not only that the alleged sexual activity occurred, but also that
both the victim and the perpetrator had the requisite state of mind required to secure a
conviction. In Ohio, to secure a conviction for rape of a victim who is over the age of
thirteen, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that sexual conduct
occurred and that the victim’s ability to consent or resist was substantially impaired.92
Assuming that the offender did not act to impair the victim for the purpose of
preventing resistance, either by force, threat of force, administration of an intoxicant,
or deception, the prosecution can prove that an act of sexual conduct was legal by
demonstrating that the victim’s ability to resist or consent was substantially impaired
because of a mental condition.93 Therefore, an opponent to the creation of a judicial
bypass mechanism might argue that this avenue of proving that a rape occurred would
be barred by the existence of a judicial order demonstrating that the person may
consent to sexual activity.
The key to understanding how the judicial bypass mechanism this Note proposes
is understanding that it simply offers the recipient the option to consent to sexual
activity; an order granting a person such an ability does not deem them to have
consented to any sexual activity occurring between them and another person or
persons. Rather, the bypass mechanism would remove the presumption that the
individual could not consent or lacked the ability to consent, and instead ask them
whether they had in fact consented—much the way criminal sexual violence
investigations and prosecutions operate for persons or victims without intellectual
and/or developmental disabilities. If a prosecutor is unable to prove the elements of
the sexual violence offense beyond a reasonable doubt based solely on the existence
of the victim’s intellectual and/or developmental disability, he or she could still pursue
a conviction under the rape statute by demonstrating that the person did not in fact
consent, and the defendant purposely compelled them to submit by force, threat,
deception, or through the administration of intoxicants.

90 The Criminal Justice System: Statistics, RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NAT’L NETWORK,
https://www.rainn.org/statistics/criminal-justice-system (last visited Oct. 12, 2020) (showing
that out of every 1,000 sexual assaults, 28 cases will lead to a felony conviction and 25
defendants will be incarcerated).
91 Richard I. Haddad, Shield or Sieve? People v. Bryant and the Rape Shield Law in HighProfile Cases, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 185, 189 (2005) (“Rape shield statutes were
created to prevent the disclosure of information about complainants’ sexual history at trial . . . .
Michigan passed the first rape shield law in 1974, and the rest of the states, the District of
Columbia, and the federal government eventually followed suit.”). See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2907.02(D) (LexisNexis 1998) (prohibiting the admission of specific instances and
reputation evidence of a rape victim’s sexual activity absent special circumstances); see also
FED. R. EVID. 412(a) (prohibiting admission of evidence offered to prove a sex-offense victim’s
sexual predisposition or that the victim engaged in other sexual behavior).
92 OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(a)–(c) (LexisNexis 2002).
93 Id.
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Not only would a judicial bypass order affirmatively granting a person the ability
to consent to sexual activity create a minimal burden or no burden to the prosecution
of sexual violence crimes against someone who has received an order, it may actually
prevent crimes of sexual violence from being perpetuated against the recipient.
Persons with disabilities are more likely to be the victims of sexual violence than those
without disabilities and are at a greater risk for being non-forcibly coerced into having
unwanted sexual experiences.94
The Center for Disease Control (“CDC”) has indicated that individual skill-based
learning is “an important component of a comprehensive approach to [sexual violence]
prevention.”95 Such skill-based learning includes social and emotional skills, healthy
intimate relationship skills, and healthy sexuality skills such as sexual communication,
sexual respect, and consent.96 Comprehensive sex education programs have also been
shown to improve health outcomes and reduce risky sexual behavior which is a risk
factor for sexual violence victimization.97
If demonstration of such skills and understanding of healthy sexuality and
affirmative consent is part of the judge’s consideration in a petitioner’s claim for a
judicial bypass, then theoretically a person who is granted an order has taken
affirmative actions to reduce his or her likelihood of being coerced into unwanted
sexual activity in the first place. Also, they will have gained the skills to verbalize their
consent or lack thereof. This Note does not suggest that a petitioner’s work with
counselors or sex educators pursuing a judicial bypass will remove all risk of
victimization. Rather, it suggests that some unique risk factors faced by people with
disabilities may be reduced by engaging with consent-centered sexual education
programming sought in pursuance of an order granting the ability to consent. Further,
such an understanding of consent may give someone receiving a judicial bypass order
the ability to better explain and describe the ways in which they did not affirmatively
consent should they later become a victim of sexual violence.
Another argument made in opposition to a judicial bypass mechanism allowing
people with intellectual and/or developmental disabilities to receive an order granting
them the legal ability to sexual activity is that judges will not be able to accurately
determine whether a person has demonstrated sufficient maturity and understanding
of the nature of sex and consent to be able to consent.98 This argument, if true, would
also raise questions of whether it is appropriate to offer a judicial bypass mechanism
for minors wishing to receive an abortion. However, the Court in Bellotti has already

94 Sexual Violence and Intimate Partner Violence Among People with Disabilities, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
AND
PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/datasources/nisvs/svandipv.html (last visited Nov. 4,
2020).
95 KATHLEEN C. BASILE ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR INJ. PREVENTION AND CONTROL, STOP SV:
A TECHNICAL PACKAGE TO PREVENT SEXUAL VIOLENCE 19 (2016).
96 Id.
97 Helen B. Chin et al., The Effectiveness of Comprehensive Risk Reduction and Abstinence
Education Interventions to Prevent or Reduce the Risk of Adolescent Pregnancy, HIV and STIs:
Two Systematic Reviews and Meta-analyses, 42 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 272, 290 (2012).
98 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 644 n. 23 (1979).
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affirmatively ruled that such a mechanism is not only permissible, but rather,
required.99 As with judicial bypass for minors seeking an abortion, the judge will
evaluate the evidence brought forth by the petitioner and determine whether an order
is appropriate, independent of his or her moral or political beliefs of the subject.
It is also important to consider that not all people with intellectual and/or
developmental disabilities would pursue a judicial bypass in order to gain the legal
right to consent, and that not all persons would be granted such a right by a judge upon
raising a claim. Therefore, the provision of the sexual violence statutes which
criminalize sexual activity with persons with certain disabilities would not be
invalidated by the creation of a judicial bypass mechanism. Similarly, the use of a
judicial bypass mechanism will not create an environment in which a particularly
vulnerable population has all statutory protections removed. This would simply grant
people with disabilities the opportunity to demonstrate that they can consent and
deserve the opportunity to choose when and whether they engage in sexual activity.
IV. CONCLUSION
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the government is
prohibited from depriving any person of “life, liberty or property, without due process
of the law.”100 Under Lawrence, the right to private sexual activity with a partner of
one’s choosing is considered a part of this right to substantive due process and concept
of personal liberty. Criminal sexual violence laws such as Ohio’s forcible rape statue
are designed to protect vulnerable populations. However, in doing so, they may
actually cause harm by creating no opportunity for an entire class of persons to engage
in lawful, consensual intimate activity. Such laws protect these populations by creating
a blanket rule that no person may engage in sexual activity with that person, by
deeming them as legally incapable of consent under any circumstances.
A solution to this problem is the creation of a judicial bypass mechanism which
would allow an individual to obtain a court order indicating they have demonstrated
that they are well informed and mature enough to make the decision to engage in
consensual sexual activity. This mechanism would allow a release valve of sorts, so
that a person may retain his or her substantive due process rights despite a state’s
interest in protecting otherwise vulnerable populations. Judicial bypass is not a novel
solution to the problem of balancing individual privacy rights against a state’s interest
in protecting its citizens, and in fact has been endorsed by the Supreme Court as the
proper method of granting minors the ability to obtain an abortion without parental
consent.101 Here, a judicial bypass mechanism would operate in the same manner, and
an individual could obtain the ability to lawfully consent to sexual activity by
demonstrating his or her maturity and that he or she is well-informed enough to
consent. The existence of a judicial bypass order would not bar prosecutors from
bringing a criminal sexual violence case against a person who victimizes the recipient
of an order, and local judges are well-equipped to determine when it is appropriate to
grant an order. Therefore, a judicial bypass mechanism that creates the right to consent
to sexual activity for persons with disabilities is a solution to protecting the privacy

99 Id. at 643.
100 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
101 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643.
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rights of such individuals without interfering with the state’s interest in protecting
people with mental, intellectual, and/or developmental disabilities from sexual
violence.
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